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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the results of Ferguson [10] on an end-product manufac-
turer’s choice of when to commit to an order quantity from its parts supplier. During
the supplier’s lead-time, information arrives about end-product demand. This infor-
mation reduces some of the forecast uncertainty. While the supplier must choose its
production quantity of parts based on the original forecast, the manufacturer can wait
to place its order from the supplier after observing the information update. We find
that a manufacturer is sometimes better off with a contract requiring an early commit-
ment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources. On the other hand,
the supplier sometimes prefers a delayed commitment. The preferences depend upon
the amount of demand uncertainty resolved by the information as well as which mem-
ber of the supply chain sets the exchange price. We also show conditions where demand
information updating is detrimental to both the manufacturer and the supplier.
∗ Send correspondence to: Mark E. Ferguson, College of Management, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA 30332.
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1 Introduction
Consider a situation where an End-Product Manufacturer (buyer) has a choice of two in-
stances to place a binding order with its component supplier. The first instance occurs before
the supplier commits resources to the production of the component. In this case, the sup-
plier produces and delivers exactly the number of units ordered. The supplier experiences
no demand risk, and the buyer is guaranteed to receive its exact order quantity. The second
instance occurs after the time at which the supplier must commit to a component produc-
tion quantity. By delaying its order until this time, the buyer learns additional information
about demand that it can use to make a better order quantity decision. The buyer’s ability
to benefit from this information is limited, however, by the fact that its order quantity is
now constrained by the (earlier) component production decision of the supplier. The sup-
plier must choose its component production quantity without the benefit of the additional
demand information and without a firm order commitment from the buyer. As a result,
the supplier must now balance the risk of lost sales against the risk of producing excess
components. We term the decision of “when to order” the commitment time frame. The
commitment time frame determines how demand risk is shared between the supplier and the
buyer — the shorter the commitment time frame, the more demand risk is shifted from the
buyer to the supplier.
This paper studies how the choice of the component price and the commitment time frame
influences the distribution of supply chain profits. We consider a series system consisting
of a single supplier providing a component to a buyer. The buyer assembles a finished good
using the component and sells it during a single selling season. The demand for the product
is stochastic and occurs according to a distribution that is known by both firms. Information
about demand arrives after the supplier’s production decision but before the buyer assembles
the final product. This updating ranges from no additional information to full knowledge
about the upcoming demand. Without loss of generality, all unfulfilled demand is lost, and
all leftover product must be scrapped at zero value.
This scenario broadly describes any product that has a multiple level supplier network, is
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sold to the end-use customer in a make-to-stock or assemble-to-order environment, and whose
producer makes production and ordering decisions in anticipation of the demand that occurs
during a single selling season. Examples include fashion items and seasonal products. The
intuition gained from our model, however, can be applied to a wider range of multi-echelon
supply chains facing stochastic demand.
To model the effect of the buyer’s commitment time frame, we investigate performance
under two settings. In the first setting, the buyer commits to its order-quantity before the
supplier commits any resources towards the production of the components. Here, the buyer
assumes all of the demand risk. This is the equivalent to setting the “frozen zone” to
its longest lead-time component or capacity decision. We phrase this choice of contract
terms as an early commitment on the part of the buyer. In the second setting, the supplier is
required to produce the component before the buyer commits to an order-quantity, forcing the
supplier to decide upon purchase and production quantities when only a demand distribution
is known. This delayed commitment by the buyer forces the supplier to share some of the
demand risk.
We characterize the supply chain members’ optimal ordering, production, and pricing de-
cisions under both early and delayed commitment for any given level of information updating.
For the early commitment case where the buyer makes all of the production decisions, we
show that the buyer’s expected profit is concave in the order quantity from the supplier. We
also show that the optimal order quantity, and resulting expected profit, is non-decreasing
in the amount of information updating. These results provide guidance for firms operating
in dynamic and fast changing environments.
Given a choice, a supplier would typically choose a high price and an early commitment.
The buyer, conversely, would prefer a low price and a later commitment. Dell Computer,
for instance, commits to an order-quantity with its suppliers only after receiving an actual
customer order. The determination of these parameters normally depends on which supply
chain party holds the most power in the relationship. For example, when Intel negotiates
with a small personal computer manufacturer, the contract terms likely favor the supplier
(Intel). On the other hand, when General Motors negotiates contract terms with one of its
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smaller parts-suppliers, the contract terms favor the buyer (GM). Then again, when two
small firms negotiate, the price is typically either determined exogenously, by the market, or
the contract terms are weighted equally between the two firms.
The examples above illustrate different power structures of a supply chain. To model
these different conditions, we investigate four price-setting scenarios. In the first scenario,
the exchange price is determined exogenously, modeling a situation where neither the buyer
nor the parts supplier can influence it. In the second setting, the supplier has the majority
of the power in the supply chain and thus sets the price. We model this scenario by allowing
the supplier to take a Stackelberg leader position in the contract negotiations. In the third
scenario, the buyer assumes the Stackelberg leader role and forces a price upon the supplier.
In the forth scenario, both members have equal power, which is modeled by finding an
exchange price that results in equal profits.
We find that it is not always in the best interest of the buyer to delay its order-quantity
commitment. Nor is it always in the best interest of the supplier to demand an early
commitment. For example, when the buyer chooses the exchange price (scenario 3), we find
that the buyer always prefers an early commitment. In the second scenario, the supplier
always prefers a delayed commitment. These results are surprising - they contradict our
intuition about who prefers what. In the other two scenarios, the commitment preference of
both members depends upon the amount of demand uncertainty resolved by the information
updating.
A second interesting finding involves the value of the demand information updating. We
show that in a decentralized supply chain under delayed commitment and a low supplier
margin, demand information updating actually decreases the expected profits for both the
supplier and the buyer. This result stems from the fact that under delayed commitment, the
supplier builds in anticipation of the buyer’s order, before the additional demand information
arrives. This finding contrast with most previous work on the value of information which
assumes centralized control of the supply chain and finds that information is always valuable.
The next few paragraphs provide a brief review of the literature and an outline for the rest
of the paper.
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Inventory models involving Bayesian forecast updates were first studied by Scarf [18].
Fisher and Raman [11] consider a two-period problem from the fashion goods industry where
a manufacturer supplying a retailer determines a production quantity for each period given
that the first period has a lower production cost but the second period has improved forecast
information. Iyer and Bergen [15] investigate how the supply chain members’ profits change
when the retailer is allowed to delay its order from the manufacturer until better informa-
tion is obtained about demand. This industry practice, termed “Quick Response”, relies
on forecast error reduction to reduce the variability of demand before the retailer commits
to its order-quantity. Iyer and Bergen [15] show that Quick Response is not always Pareto
improving. In particular, for small supplier margins the supplier is worse off but the buyer
is better off with demand information updating. By allowing the supplier to act strategi-
cally, we show that both the supplier and buyer may be worse off with demand information
updating. Work involving forecast updates over multiple periods include Tsay and Lovejoy
[22] and Kaminsky and Swaminathan [16].
Several papers investigate multiple ordering opportunities where a delayed commitment
can either be purchased up front as an option, or purchased later at a higher per unit cost,
possibly through a spot market. Brown and Lee [1] analyze a class of single-period, “pay-
to-delay” capacity reservation contracts for the semiconductor manufacturing industry. In
these contracts, the buyer is guaranteed a portion of the supplier’s capacity as well as an
additional amount that can be purchased at an extra price, after additional information about
demand is obtained. Papers modeling a higher later cost or spot markets include Donohue
[7], Huang, Sethi and Yan [14], and Seifert, Thonemann and Hausman [19]. Serel, Dada
and Moskowitz [20] and Golovachkina and Bradley [12] compare both capacity reservations
and spot markets. Our model differs from the ones above in that we restrict the buyer to
a single order opportunity; either early or delayed. While mathematically our restriction
on the timing of the buyer’s commitment may seem like two points on a continuum, in
practice, these are often the only two possible choices. Many components, such as ASICS
and printed circuit boards in the electronics industry, are unique to a specific product. Such
components are not available on a spot market, nor is it possible to dramatically compress
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their manufacturing lead-times. Thus, irrevocable quantity decisions must be made at the
cumulative lead-time of the final product.
In a second contrast to our model, all of the previously mentioned papers assume the
supplier either always provides the buyer with its order-quantity request, or builds nothing
without a firm order commitment. We term this supplier behavior as “non-strategic”. In
contrast, we model a “strategic” supplier that builds without a firm commitment because
he knows the underlying demand distribution and anticipates the buyer’s order. Sharing the
demand uncertainty comes at a price to the buyer however, as the supplier builds a quantity
that maximizes his own expected profit. Papers modeling strategic supplier behavior include
Lariviere and Porteus [17], Cachon and Lariviere [3], Gurnani and Tang [13], Deng and Yano
[5][6], Erkoc and Wu [9], Taylor [21], Cachon [3], and Ferguson [10]. Of the above, Ferguson
[10], Lariviere and Porteus [17], Taylor [21], and Cachon [3] are the closest in spirit to our
paper. The later three only consider a single power structure for choosing the exchange
price, concentrate on our special case of full information updating, and model a supplier-
retailer supply chain where a second production opportunity is not possible after demand
information is updated. Ferguson [10] provides a review of this literature and presents
a model that includes the same power and supply chain structures as ours. His paper
however, assumes that either all or none of the demand uncertainty is resolved with some
predetermined probability. Our model, in contrast, allows the demand information to vary
continuously from non-informative to full information. This approach offers deeper insights
into how the value of the future information affects the supply chain members’ choice of the
commitment time.
In the next section we describe the model and in Section 3 we analyze the two commitment
time frame choices under an exogenous exchange price. In Section 4 we look at the impact of
information updating along with each supply chain member’s commitment time preference
for a given exchange price. In Section 5 we extend our analysis to three common supply-chain
power structures and in Section 6, we point out some managerial insights and directions for
future research. All proofs are given in an appendix.
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2 Model Description
A single manufacturer (the buyer) assembles a finished good requiring a component, or a
set of components, provided by a single supplier. Both the supplier and the end-product
manufacturer (buyer) have positive manufacturing lead-times that are long compared to the
single selling season of the end-product. The lead-time for the supplier is denoted by TS and
that of the buyer by TB, so production of the components must begin at least TS+TB periods
prior to the final product demand realization. Thus, we have a two-stage newsvendor model.
All information is shared between the two parties including prices, cost, and the demand
distribution for the end-product.
The decision variables include the quantity of components produced by the supplier,
PS, the quantity of components ordered by the buyer, Q, and the quantity of final product
assembled by the buyer, PB. Because each final product contains exactly one component (or
one component set), the final production quantity is constrained by the first two variables
i.e. PB ≤ min(PS, Q). Time is counted backwards to the final product demand realization:
The component production quantity decision, PS, is made at t = TS + TB, the final product
production quantity decision, PB, is made at t = TB, and final product demand occurs at
t = 0. The mechanics of our model are not dependent on the actual lengths of the firms’ lead-
times and their lengths do not have to be equal. Thus, we simplify notation by designating
two periods in which decisions must be made. Period 1 corresponds to the time period from
t = TS + TB until t = TB and period 2 represents the time period from t = TB to t = 0.
Through our model we investigate the optimal choice for the timing of the buyer’s order
quantity decision, Q.
End-product demand is represented by the random variable Z, made up of two compo-
nents i.e. Z = X+Y. The random variables X and Y are independent and have continuous




Y . Let FX(x) (FY (y)) be
the cdfs, F−1X (x) (F
−1
Y (y)) the inverses, and define F̄X(x) = 1−FX(x) (F̄Y (y) = 1−FY (y)).
The first component, X, represents the uncertainty that gets resolved before the buyer
makes its production quantity decision where E[X] = µ and Pr[LX ≤ X ≤ HX ] = 1 for
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0 ≤ LX ≤ HX . The second component, Y, represents residual demand uncertainty about
the product where E[Y ] = 0 and Pr[LY ≤ Y ≤ HY ] = 1 for LY ≤ 0 ≤ HY . We as-
sume that demand is bounded from below by zero, i.e., LX + LY = 0 (The assumptions
about bounds are not strictly necessary; they are made for convenience only. We drop
them in the numerical examples.) Before any uncertainty is resolved, Z has E[Z] = µ and
Pr[LX+LY ≤ Z ≤ HX+HY ] = 1. Assume the distribution for Z has the strictly Increasing
Generalized Failure Rate (IGFR) property. Many commonly used distributions have the
IGFR property, including the Normal, the exponential, the gamma and the Weibull. After
information arrives and the buyer observes X = x, conditioned end-product demand satisfies
E[Z|X = x] = x and Pr[Z ≤ q|X = x] = Pr[Y ≤ q − x].
It is useful in our analysis to measure the amount of demand uncertainty that is reduced
by the new information. We assign the parameter ρ to represent this amount where
ρ =
V ar(X)
V ar(X) + V ar(Y )
. (1)
Thus, a value of ρ = 0 represents the case where the new information provides no additional
insight into the quantity of end-product demand. A value of ρ = 1 occurs when the incoming
information provides the buyer with the exact quantity of end-product demand. In all cases,
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
The supplier faces a unit variable production cost of cS. and sells the component to the
buyer at an exchange price of w per unit. The specification of the exchange price occurs
prior to any production by either party and depends upon the power structure of the supply
chain. The buyer’s unit variable production cost is cB and each unit of product sold by the
buyer to its customers generates revenue r, which is dictated by the buyer’s market and is
exogenous to our model. All leftover final product and components are scrapped at zero
value. We consider only the most relevant and interesting case, where r ≥ w + cB and
w ≥ cS.
We solve this multiparty decision problem by backward induction, assuming that the
decision maker at each step acts optimally, given the current information at hand and an-
ticipating (likewise) optimal behavior by the decision maker in each subsequent step. Since
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both firms are assumed risk neutral, each aims to maximize its expected profit. In both
scenarios (early and delayed commitment), the exchange price is determined prior to the
start of the game based on the power structure of the supply chain. For the two unbalanced
power cases (supplier chooses price and buyer chooses price), the firm wielding the supply
chain power selects a price that maximizes its expected profit assuming an optimal response
to that price by the other firm. For the balanced power case (equal profit), the price is
selected based upon the intersection of the two firms’ optimal profit functions.
The major difference between the early and delayed commitment scenarios stems from
the allocation of the demand risk. In particular, the early commitment scenario assigns
all of the demand risk to the buyer, while the delayed commitment scenario shares the risk
between the two firms. The actual percentage of the demand risk allocated to the supplier
in the later scenario is dependent upon the amount of demand forecast variance reduction
that occurs due to the arrival of additional information.
3 Exogenous Exchange Price Analysis
In this section, we present the firms’ optimal ordering and production decisions for both an
early and a delayed commitment when the exchange price is exogenous. There are many
instances when an exchange price can be considered exogenous. This scenario is common
when a supplier provides for multiple buyers and does not want to price discriminate between
them or when the price is set by external market pressures posed by competing suppliers.
In Section 5, we expand our study to include the cases when the exchange price is set under
three different supply chain power structures.
3.1 Early Commitment: Q decided at t = TS + TB
First, we examine the case where the buyer takes on all of the demand risk. The supplier’s
order-quantity as well as its profit is deterministic, dependent only upon the buyer’s order-
quantity. The early commitment case involves the following timing of events:
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1. The exchange price w is set based upon the power structure of the supply chain.
2. At the beginning of period 1, the buyer commits to order Q components from the
supplier. The supplier produces PS = Q units and makes a profit equal to (w− cS)Q.
3. After the buyer has committed to its order quantity but prior to the beginning of
period 2, X is observed.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the buyer selects its final product desired optimal pro-
duction quantity P ∗B based on its new revised forecast of demand. Final product pro-
duction is constrained by the number of components available, Q. Thus, the buyer’s
actual production quantity is PAB = min(Q,P
∗
B), where the superscript A represents
the quantity actually produced. Any component surplus is scrapped at zero value.
5. At the end of period 2, market demand, Z, is revealed, and all revenues and cost are
incurred.
Figure 1 illustrates the decisions made for the early commitment case over time.
*** Insert Figure 1 here ***
With the exchange price set, the only decision variables are the buyer’s order-quantity
before the demand information is received and the buyer’s production quantity after receiving
the demand information. The supplier plays a passive role in this scenario, as he will produce
any quantity requested by the buyer as long as the exchange price covers its manufacturing
cost i.e. w > cS. As a result, the decision variable PS does not appear in this scenario. We
begin with the buyer’s period 2 production decision and use backward induction to find its
optimal period 1 order quantity. In the appendix, we provide an additional formulation of
the problem that is easier to solve numerically.
The buyer’s period 2 objective is
MaxPB : − cBPB + rEZ [min(PB, Z)], s.t. PB ≤ Q .
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At the beginning of period 2, some demand information, X = x is observed. Substituting
X = x into the objective and performing a change of variables by setting k = PB − x gives
Maxk : − cB(k + x) + rEY [min(x+ k, x+ Y )] s.t. k ≤ Q− x .
Rearranging terms gives
Maxk : (r − cB)x− cBk + rEY [min(k, Y )] s.t. k ≤ Q− x . (2)
Note that once X = x is observed, the mean of the demand distribution is updated to be x,
thus k can be interpreted as the safety stock associated with a production choice PB. Now
define
H(k) = −cBk + rEY [min(k, Y )]
as the variable expected profit given a safety stock of k. The objective of (2) is (r− cB)x+
H(k) and (r−cB)x is a constant, so we can equivalently maximize H(k), which is concave in
k. Let k∗ be the largest k that maximizes H(k) globally, ignoring the constraint k ≤ Q−x.







where k∗ is the unconstrained optimal safety stock, is independent of x, and is computed
by solving H 0(k) = 0. The buyer’s constrained optimal level of final product safety stock is
min{k∗, Q− x}.
Next we relate the buyer’s period 2 expected profit to the component order quantity, Q.
We do so by substituting in the optimal value of k into (2). Define
~π(Q, x) = (r − cB)x+H(min{k∗, Q− x}) .
In the first period, both X and Y are unknown when the buyer makes its component order
quantity decision. The period 1 objective is
MaxQ : πB(Q) = EX [−wQ+ ~π(Q,X)] . (3)
Proposition 1 Under early commitment, (3) is concave in Q.
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(All proofs are in the Appendix.) Thus, the optimalQ is found by solving ∂π(Q)/∂Q = 0.
We refer to this optimal order quantity as Q∗ and the buyer’s optimal expected profit as π∗B.
Under early commitment, the supplier assumes no demand risk and makes a profit of
π∗S(w) = (w − cS)Q∗ . (4)
The buyer’s expected profit, π∗B, is given by
π∗B(w) = −wQ∗ − cB(µ+ k∗) + cBLX(Q∗ − k∗) + rµ− rLZ(µ+ k∗ − LX(Q∗ − k∗)), (5)
where LX() and LZ() are the loss functions for their respective distributions. The resulting




S(w). Figure 2 plots
the buyer’s and supplier’s expected profit over all feasible exchange prices under early com-
mitment given the following parameter values: r = 100, cB = cS = 20, Z˜ N(100, 20), and
ρ = 1. The labels wSwB, and wE point out the exchange prices selected by the three power
structures described in Section 5.
*** Insert Figure 2 here ***
3.2 Delayed Commitment: Q decided at t = TB
In this next scenario, the buyer and the supplier share the demand risk. The buyer commits
to its order-quantity only after the supplier has produced the components and the buyer
has learned more information about demand. The buyer’s commitment time frame is now
equal to its manufacturing lead-time only. The timing of events is the same as described in
the early commitment section with two exceptions: 1) it is now the supplier that decides
how many components to produce, and 2) the buyer does not place a formal order with the
supplier until after receiving the information about demand. For clarification purposes, we
distinguish our parameters and decision variables from the early commitment case through
the placement of a tilde above the corresponding variable symbol. For instance, the variable
k becomes k̃. Figure 3 illustrates the decisions made for the delayed commitment case over
time.
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*** Insert Figure 3 here ***
With a delayed commitment by the buyer, the supplier no longer plays a passive role
in the decision making as he must now decide how many components to produce, prior to
receiving a firm order-quantity commitment from the buyer. The decision variables are the
supplier’s production quantity, PS, made before the information about demand is received,
and the buyer’s production quantity, P̃B, made after receiving the additional information
about end-product demand (since the buyer makes its component order quantity and final
production quantity decisions at the same time, Q̃ = P̃B so the decision variable Q̃ does not
appear in this scenario). We begin, as before, with the buyer’s period 2 production decision
and work backwards to solve the supplier’s period 1 production decision.
As in the previous case, partial demand information X = x has been observed at the
beginning of period 2. The buyer selects its final product production quantity, PB, by
maximizing its expected profit
Max π̃B(P̃B, x) = −(w + cB)P̃B + rE[min(P̃B, x+ Y )] ,
We again make the change of variables k̃ = P̃B − x. The resulting objective function is
concave in k̃, so first order conditions yield the optimal unconstrained production decision








The buyer’s actual production quantity is the minimum of its desired production quantity
and the number of components available from the supplier, P̃AB = min(P̃
∗
B, PS).
The supplier’s objective function at the beginning of period 1 is
MaxP̃S π̃
∗
S(P̃S) = −cSP̃S + wE[min(X + k̃∗, P̃S)] . (6)
Assuming that X is a continuous variable, (6) can be expressed as







Solving for first order conditions gives an optimal supplier’s production quantity of







+ k̃∗ . (7)
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The supplier’s expected profit for the delayed case is
π̃∗S(w) = −cSP̃ ∗S + wE[min(X + k̃∗, P̃ ∗S)] , (8)
and the buyer’s expected profit is
π̃∗B(w) = −(w + cB)
h
(µ+ k̃∗)− LX(P̃ ∗S − k̃∗)
i
+ rµ− rLZ(µ+ k̃∗ − LX(P̃ ∗S − k̃∗)) . (9)





Figure 4 plots the buyer’s and supplier’s expected profit under delayed commitment using
the same parameter values as in the early commitment example. Once again, the labels w̃B,
w̃E, and w̃S point out the exchange prices selected by the three power structures discussed
in Section 5.
*** Insert Figure 4 here ***
4 Impact of Information Updating
In this section we investigate how the amount of information updating (i.e., the size of ρ)
affects the buyer’s first-period order quantity and the two players’ profits under any given
wholesale price. The generality of our model prevents us from obtaining closed form solutions
under the early commitment case for the optimal order and production quantities when 0 <
ρ < 1. Closed form solutions can be obtained at the boundary cases corresponding to either
no additional demand information or full information. In the no additional information
case, the buyer faces the same demand distribution for both its ordering and production
decisions. This situation is common for firms lacking sophisticated information systems
or market analysis capabilities. Mathematically, this case is represented by ρ = 0 and we
denote it through the use of the subscript NA (No Additional) on the decision variables.
In the full information case, the buyer knows exactly what demand will be before making
its final product production decision. This case represents the environment of assemble-to-
order firms such as Dell Computer. Mathematically, this case is represented by ρ = 1 and
we denote it through the use of the subscript FI (Full Information) on the decision variables.
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Table 1 summarizes the production quantity decisions made by the supplier and the buyer
for No, Partial, and Full information updating.
Early Commitment Delayed Commitment
































































Table 1: Production Quantities for Increasing Demand Information (ρ)
By comparing the solutions from Table 1, we can study the impact of ρ on the optimal
decisions and expected profits. We do so for the special case of normally distributed demand.
All results in this section assume that the initial variance of the demand distribution is equal
under both boundary cases (that is, V ar(Y ) for case NA = V ar(X) for case FI). The first
result involves the optimal production quantity of components by the supplier. Under
early commitment and any given exchange price, we show analytically (for small amounts
of information updating) that Q∗ ≥ Q∗NA and numerically that Q∗FI ≥ Q∗ ≥ Q∗NA, where
Q∗ is the optimal order quantity of the general case (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1). Thus, as the buyer
anticipates more information about demand becoming available in period two, she orders
larger quantities of components from the supplier.
Proposition 2 Under Normally distributed demand, early commitment, small values
of ρ, and for any given exchange price w, we have Q∗ ≥ Q∗NA.
Table 2 gives the optimal order quantities for three different exchange prices, five in-
creasing levels of variance reduction, and nine test cases. The test cases were chosen to
demonstrate three states each of the buyer’s cost and demand variance. In each case, the
optimal Q increases with the amount of variance reduction. An intuitive argument for this
result is that as ρ increases, the buyer is able to make better second period decisions which
1Proven analytically for small ρ and shown numerically in general
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lowers its overage cost. The choice of Q∗ depends on the balance of the firm’s overage and
underage cost. As the firm’s overage cost decreases while its underage cost remains the same,
then Q∗ increases with ρ. Our numerical test also seem to indicate that Q∗FI ≥ Q∗ ≥ Q∗NA.
*** Insert Table 2 here ***
The next two propositions describe how the expected profits of the buyer and the supplier
are affected by increases in the amount of variance reduction.
Proposition 3 Under early commitment and for any given exchange price w, and π∗B
are non-decreasing in ρ.
Under early commitment, the buyer serves as the only quantity setting decision maker.
As ρ increases, the buyer receives additional information about the final product demand.
Suppose that the use of the additional information results in lower expected profits. Since the
buyer is the only decision maker, she can always choose not to use the additional information
and receive the same expected profit she would have received had the information not arrived.
Thus, the buyer’s profit is increasing with an increase in additional information, i.e. as
ρ increases. Our numerical studies indicate that the supplier’s expected profit is non-
decreasing in ρ as well. Since the supplier’s profit (4) is monotonically increasing in Q∗,
then if Q∗ is non-decreasing in ρ (as indicated in Table 2), so is the supplier’s profit. Thus,
additional demand information seems to benefit both the supplier and the buyer under early
commitment.
Early Delayed











ρ = 0 (NA) 104.0 208.1 5018 104.0 208.1 5018
ρ = .50 105.5 211.0 5230 84.0 154.8 4651
ρ = 1 (FI) 112.0 223.9 5266 73.3 128.0 4202
Table 3: Effect of ρ on Prod Qnty and Profits under Early and Delayed Commitment
(Z˜N(100, 20), r = 100, cB = 20, cS = 20, w = 22)
Under delayed commitment, additional demand information is sometimes detrimental to
both the buyer and the supplier. In particular, below a certain threshold exchange price,
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the supplier’s production quantity decreases with ρ, (P̃ ∗B,FI ≤ P̃ ∗B,NA). This is demonstrated
through a numeric example in Table 3. For an exchange price of w = 22 and the same
parameter values used to generate Figures 2 and 4, we give the supplier’s production quan-
tity, the supplier’s expected profit, and the buyer’s expected profit under early and delayed
commitment for three values of ρ : No Additional Information (ρ = 0), Partial Information
(ρ = .5), and Full Information (ρ = 1). As expected, all three variables increase with ρ
under early commitment. What is less intuitive is the fact that they all decrease with ρ
under delayed commitment. To understand why, observe the supplier’s optimal production
decisions under delayed commitment given in Table 1. With no information updating, the
supplier builds the buyer’s critical fractile solution since he faces no demand uncertainty risk
in this case. With full information updating, the supplier builds its own critical fractile
solution because he absorbs all of the demand uncertainty risk. Thus, when the supplier’s
margin is small then his fractile is also small so he produces less than the expected demand.
Since the sales quantity for the entire supply chain is constrained by the production quantity
of the supplier, both members are penalized by the supplier’s profit maximizing decision.
These observations are formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under delayed commitment, there exist exchange prices sufficiently
close to cS where π̃
∗
S,FI ≤ π̃∗S,NA and π̃∗B,FI ≤ π̃∗B,NA as well as exchange prices sufficiently
close to r − cB where π̃∗S,FI ≥ π̃∗S,NA and π̃∗B,FI ≥ π̃∗B,NA.
Unlike the early commitment case, the supplier’s profit under delayed commitment when
0 < ρ < 1 is not bounded by the full and no additional information cases. In fact, our
numerical results indicate that there often exists a range of exchange prices where the sup-
plier’s expected profit under partial information is lower than both the no additional and the






S. Figure 5 plots the supplier’s expected
profit under delayed commitment for the full, partial, and no additional information cases.
Notice that for exchange prices between 45 and 60, the supplier’s expected profit with partial
information is the lowest of the three. Table 4 summarizes the results from this section.
*** Insert Figure 5 here ***
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Early Commitment Delayed Commitment
Buyer’s Order Quantity Q∗ ↑ NA
Buyer’s Profit π∗B ↑ ↑↓ (depends on w)
Supplier’s Profit π∗S ↑ ↑↓ (depends on w)
Table 4: Direction of Change Resulting from Increasing Demand Information (ρ)
4.1 Affect of Exogenous Exchange Price on Commitment Time
Choice
In this section, we explore how the exogenous exchange price affects the choice of commitment
time. Because we do not have a closed form expression for the Q∗, comparisons must be
made numerically for cases where 0 < ρ < 1. To do so, we took 100 random draws from
the parameter sets: σZ/µ ∈ [.01, .4] , cS/r ∈ [.1, .6] , and cB/r ∈ [.1, r − cS − .1] . We then
calculated the optimal expected profits under early and delayed commitment over the entire
range of feasible exchange prices and ρ = [0, .25, .5, .75, 1]. The numerical observations listed
below held true for all 100 cases tested.
For illustrative purposes, we combine the plots of the early commitment profits with those
of the delayed commitment. Figure 6 shows the supplier’s and buyer’s expected profits as
a function of the exchange price for both the early and delayed commitment cases when
ρ = 1. Figure 7 plots these same functions when ρ = 0.5. Table 5 presents a subset of our
numerical experiments for demonstration purposes.
*** Insert Figures 6 and 7 here ***
When no information updating occurs, there is no difference in the expected profits of
either firm between the early and delayed commitment cases. With some positive amount
of information updating however, there exists an exchange price below which the buyer has
higher expected profits with an early commitment and above which its profits are higher
with a delayed commitment. This transition occurs where the buyer’s profit curves cross as
in Figures 6 and 7. We formalize this result in the following numerical conjecture.
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Numerical Observation 1 For Normally distributed demand and ρ > 0, there exists
a maximum feasible exchange price wt,B, below which π∗B ≥ π̃∗B and above which π∗B ≤ π̃∗B.
This result is surprising because general intuition leads one to expect the buyer to always
prefer delaying its order quantity commitment until more information about demand is
available. Under early commitment, the supplier accepts any order quantity from the
buyer, regardless of its margin, as a guaranteed small profit is better than no profit. By
delaying its order quantity however, the buyer subjects the supplier to sharing part of the
demand risk. Facing an uncertain order quantity, the supplier reacts by producing a quantity
based on its own critical fractile solution that approaches zero as its margin approaches zero.
The buyer is then constrained from producing its desired end-product production quantity
by the amount of components that the supplier produced. The wt,B row in Table 5 lists
the exchange prices where the buyer’s expected profit curves cross for four sample cases
representing high and low levels of both the buyer’s margin and the coefficient of variation
of the demand distribution. The next conjecture states that the supplier’s profit also has
this characteristic although the transition occurs at a different exchange price.
Numerical Observation 2 For Normally distributed demand and ρ > 0, there exists
an exchange price wt,S such that π∗S ≥ π̃∗S for all feasible w ≤ wt,S and π∗S ≤ π̃∗S for all
feasible w > wt,S.
This is also a counter intuitive result as one expects the supplier to always prefer a de-
terministic order quantity over a probabilistic one. It turns out that under higher exchange
prices, the reduced uncertainty about demand counters the effect of the lower buyer mar-
gins. Thus, the buyer purchases more units than she would if she were forced into an early
commitment. As shown in section 3, under early commitment the buyer bases her order
quantity on a critical fractile type solution that decreases with her margins. Under delayed
commitment, the buyer is able to observe additional information about demand before se-
lecting her order quantity. This is most obvious at the boundary case ρ = 1 where full
information about demand arrives. Here, the buyer orders a quantity from the supplier
equal to the (now) known demand amount and her order quantity is independent of the size
of its margin because she no longer faces any of the demand risk. The wt,S row in Table
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5 lists the exchange prices where the supplier’s expected profit curves cross for our sample
cases. If the expected profit curves never cross, then early commitment dominates over
all feasible exchange prices. These cases, distinguished by the upper limit of the feasible
exchange prices in our table, occur only in low supplier margin scenarios.
µ 100 100 1000 1000
cS 20 60 20 60
Variance 25 31 75 30 74
wt,B Reduction 50 30 72 29 72
(%) 75 30 69 30 69
100 31 65 31 65
Variance 25 75 80* 32 80*
wt,S Reduction 50 68 80* 34 80*
(%) 75 62 79 37 79
100 57 74 57 74
Table 5: Exch Price where Early and Delayed Profits Cross: Buyer (wt,B) and Supplier (wt,S)
(Normal Dist, Total Variance = 400, Buyer’s Price = 100, Buyer’s Cost = 20)
* Profits under early commitment are always larger
5 Impact of Supply Chain Pricing Power
In this section, we explore the impact of different power structures in the supply chain by
comparing the expected profits for both supply chain members under our three exchange
price setting scenarios. We first characterize the optimal prices for each power structure
under early and delayed commitment. We then provide a decision framework that allows
us to conclude which commitment time choice results under each structure.
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5.1 Power Structures Under Early Commitment
When the supplier wields the majority of the power in the supply chain and thus sets the
exchange price, her objective function is
Maxw : π
∗
S(w) = (w − cS)Q∗ s.t. π∗B(w) ≥ 0. (10)
In this scenario, the supplier is setting a price for a buyer that orders based on a newsvendor
solution. Let wS represent the price that maximizes the supplier’s expected profits under
early commitment. Because we have closed form expressions for Q∗ when ρ = 0 and ρ = 1,
we can solve for wS in terms of Q∗ :
wS(Q∗)ρ=0 = r − cB − rFZ(Q∗) and wS(Q∗)ρ=1 = r − cB − (r − cB)FX(Q∗).
The price chosen by the supplier for our numerical example is denoted by wS in Figure 2.
Lariviere and Porteus [17] show that for the case of ρ = 1, the supplier’s profit is unimodal
in w if the demand distribution is IGFR. It is easy to show that the same is true for the
ρ = 0 case. For intermediate values, 0 < ρ < 1, such properties are harder to show because
of the lack of a closed form expression for Q∗. In Table 6, we offer a small numerical test
to show how wS changes with ρ. While the changes are small, the test indicates that wS is
non-increasing in ρ.
µ 50 50 100 100 1000 1000
cS 20 60 20 60 20 60
0 61.9 73.2 72.2 77.5 79.6 79.9
Variance 20 61.9 73.2 72.2 77.5 79.6 79.9
Reduction 50 61.5 73.2 72.1 77.5 79.6 79.9
(%) 80 61.4 73.2 72.0 77.5 79.6 79.9
100 61.4 73.2 72.0 77.5 79.6 79.9
Table 6: Optimal Exchange Price When Supplier Sets The Price
(Normal Dist, Total Variance = 400, Buyer’s Price = 100, Buyer’s Cost = 20)
What happens when the buyer wields the pricing power in the supply chain and sets the
selling price of the supplier? In the early commitment case, the buyer is assured of receiving
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its order-quantity as long as the supplier makes a positive profit. Since the buyer assumes
all of the demand uncertainty risk regardless of the value of ρ, he sets a price incrementally
larger than the supplier’s marginal cost. The price chosen by the buyer for our numerical
example is denoted by wB in Figure 2.
What happens if the supplier and the buyer have equal price negotiating power? To
model this scenario, we look at a simple heuristic that divides the profits among the supplier
and the buyer equally. This “equal profits” exchange price is found by setting π∗B(w) =
π∗S(w) and solving for the exchange price. For the normal distribution, there exist a unique
exchange price where this occurs. Dividing profits equally is not an optimal or equilibrium
mechanism, and it is rarely seen in the literature. It is not uncommon in practice, however,
simply because it reflects a crude notion of fairness. The price chosen under equal power
for our numerical example is denoted by wE in Figure 2.
5.2 Power Structures Under Delayed Commitment
Under delayed commitment, when the supplier sets the price it must be high enough that






B(w) ≥ 0 , (11)
where π∗S(w) comes from equation (8) and π̃
∗
B(w) comes from equation (9). Let w̃
S represent
the price that maximizes the supplier’s expected profits under delayed commitment. The
supplier’s optimal price in terms of P̃ ∗B is
w̃S(P̃ ∗B) = r − cB − rFY (P̃ ∗B).
This expression holds for all values of ρ. The supplier’s profit is unimodal in w if the demand
distribution is IGFR (Lariviere and Porteus [17]).
What about when the buyer sets the price? In the early commitment case, when the
buyer sets the exchange price she sets it equal to the supplier’s cost in the limit, capturing
most of the supply chain profits. The supplier accepted such a low price because he did not
share any of the demand uncertainty risk. Under delayed commitment, this is no longer the
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case. The price chosen by the buyer must now be high enough that the supplier makes a





S(w) ≥ 0 ,
where π̃∗B(w) comes from (9) and π
∗
S(w) from (8). Let w̃
B represent the price that maximizes
the buyer’s expected profits under delayed commitment. The buyer’s optimal price in terms
of P̃ ∗S is
w̃B(P̃ ∗S) =
cS
1− FX(P̃ ∗S − k̃∗)
. (12)
This expression also holds for all values of ρ. Cachon and Lariviere [3] show that for the case
of ρ = 1, the buyer’s profit is unimodal in w if the demand distribution is IGFR Their proof
can be easily extended to our partial information updating scenario since the only difference
is the inclusion of k̃∗ in (12), which is not a function of w.
As in the early commitment case, an “equal profits” exchange price under delayed com-
mitment is found by equating the supplier’s expected profit (8) with the expected profit of
the buyer (9) and solving for the exchange price.
In the following subsections, we show how each supply chain member’s preference for an
early or delayed commitment changes for each of the three power structures investigated;
supplier chooses price, buyer chooses price, and equal profits. We also show which commit-
ment choice results under each structure. To do so, however, we must specify the decision
framework and timing. First, the supply chain member(s) with price setting power propose
two separate prices for each commitment time alternative (early or delayed). Next, we
assume that the buyer always has the option of choosing an early commitment. While the
buyer probably could not impose a choice of delayed commitment (without the supplier’s
willingness to accept such an arrangement), she could impose a choice of early commitment
by simply choosing to place her order early even if the supplier were willing to accept (and
even preferred) a delayed commitment. Realistically, it is hard to imagine situations where
a supplier can justify not letting a buyer commit early to an order quantity. Lastly, the
buyer chooses the price, and corresponding commitment time, that maximizes her expected
profit.
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5.3 Commitment Choice When The Supplier Chooses The Price
To analyze supply chains where the supplier is more powerful than the buyer, we consider
the model in which the supplier chooses the wholesale price. The supplier first calculates
wS(Q∗) and w̃S(P̃ ∗B), then offers the choice between the two prices to the buyer. The buyer
then chooses the price, and corresponding commitment time, that maximizes her expected
profits.
Given an exchange price chosen by the supplier, the supplier prefers a delayed commit-
ment while the buyer prefers an early commitment. This result is easier to see under the
full information updating case. Under early commitment, the buyer orders based on her
critical fractile solution, forcing the supplier to select an exchange price that shares some of
the supply chain profits with the buyer. Under delayed commitment and ρ = 1, the buyer
orders exactly the amount of components that she knows end-product demand will be, even
when faced with very small margins (a guaranteed small profit is better than no profit).
This allows the supplier, in the limit, to set the exchange price equal to the buyer’s revenue
minus her end-product production cost and capture the entire supply chain’s profit. Our
numerical test indicate that this result holds for the case of partial information updating
as well. To illustrate, consider the numerical example used to create Figure 7, a partial
information updating scenario. The supplier first solves for his optimal price under early
and delayed commitment, obtaining wS = 70 and w̃S = 79 respectively. The supplier
then offers this set of prices to the buyer, who solves for her expected profit under each
price/commitment time choice and chooses the larger. In this case, the buyer chooses an
early commitment with wS = 70, resulting in an expected profit of π∗B = 7430 compared to
π̃∗B = 535 if she had chosen the delayed commitment price. Thus, when the supplier has
pricing power in the supply chain, there exist conflicting preferences regarding the buyer’s
commitment timeframe. Since we assume the buyer has the final choice, a choice of early
commitment results.
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5.4 Commitment Choice When The Buyer Chooses The Price
Given an exchange price chosen by the buyer and some positive amount of information
updating, the buyer prefers an early commitment while the supplier prefers a delayed com-
mitment. When the buyer chooses the exchange price under early commitment, she chooses
a price equal to the supplier’s cost plus a small margin (wB(Q∗) = cS+ δ) and extracts most
of the supply chain’s profit. Under delayed commitment however, the supplier produces
based upon his critical fractile solution, equal to zero when the buyer chooses a price equal
to the supplier’s cost. The buyer is thus forced to give the supplier a margin large enough
to induce him to produce the quantity of components that the buyer desires. This results
in the supplier making a positive profit and the buyer making a smaller profit under delayed
commitment. As in the case of supplier pricing, when the buyer has pricing power the buyer
prefers an early commitment while the supplier prefers a delayed commitment. Since we
assume the buyer has the final choice, a choice of early commitment results.
5.5 Commitment Choice Under Equal Power
To analyze supply chains where both members have equal power, we consider the model in
which the wholesale price is set through our equal profits heuristic. Let wE represent the
price that solves the equal profits objective under early commitment and w̃E, the price that
solves the equal profits objective under delayed commitment. We use a similar numeri-
cal experiment as the one described in the beginning of Section 4.1 to test our observation
which compares the firms’ expected profits when information updating occurs. The obser-
vation held true for all 100 cases tested. Table 6 provides a subset of our experiments for
demonstration purposes.
Numerical Observation 3 For Normally distributed demand and an exchange price





¤−£π̃∗S(w̃E) = π̃∗B(w̃E)¤ is decreas-
ing in ρ.
When the buyer and the supplier set an “equal profits” price, both members prefer an
early commitment for small reductions in demand uncertainty. This is shown in Figure 7
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for an example with ρ = 0.5 where the intersection of the early commitment profits results
in a higher profit than the intersection of the delayed commitment profits. This preferences
reverses however when ρ = 1. Table 6 lists the difference between the supply chain’s total
expected profit at the early equal profit price and at the delayed equal profit price for our
sample cases.
µ 100 100 1000 1000
cS 20 60 20 60
Variance 25 107 178 * 182
Reduction 50 81 166 * 161
(%) 75 -20 151 * 127
100 -207 24 * 0
Table 6: Total Early Minus Total Delayed Profits at Equal Profit Price
(Normal Dist, Total Variance = 400, Buyer’s Price = 100, Buyer’s Cost = 20)
* No feasible equal profits price
The preceding results for the various pricing scenarios emphasize the important roles
that the level of demand information updating and the supply chain power structure play
in determining behavior and performance in the supply chain. In both of the extreme
power cases (supplier chooses price and buyer chooses price), the two supply chain members
prefer opposite commitment timeframes, and those preferences are independent of both
who has pricing power and the amount of updated demand information that arrives at the
end of period 1. In those cases, since the buyer can probably enforce its preference for
early commitment, that is what is likely to result. However, when power is more equally
distributed between the two supply chain members, the players prefer the same commitment
timeframe, and this preference changes from early commitment to delayed commitment as
the information contained in the demand update increases. Table 7 summarizes the results
from this section below.
25
Buyer’s Preference Supplier’s Preference Outcome
Supplier Pricing Power Early Delayed Early
Buyer Pricing Power Early Delayed Early
Equal Power* Early for small ρ Early for small ρ Early for small ρ
Delayed for large ρ Delayed for large ρ Delayed for large ρ
Table 7: Impact of Pricing Power and Information on Commitment Timeframe Preferences
*Based on Numeric Observations
6 Conclusions and Future Research
We have examined the implications surrounding the choice of the quantity commitment
time by an end-product manufacturer (buyer) and its parts supplier in a stochastic demand
environment under four different supply chain power structures. Our model captures the
key trade-offs associated with the timing selection of the buyer’s order quantity commitment
in a supply chain. An early commitment by the buyer ensures that she will receive her
order quantity and eliminates all of the demand risk of the supplier. However, an early
commitment limits the buyer’s ability to respond later if new information is obtained about
demand. Delayed commitment increases the buyer’s flexibility but introduces the risk that
the supplier (now facing its own demand risk) will not provide the buyer with her full
order quantity request. We characterize each supply chain member’s objective under the
two commitment timing choices and provide properties for optimal decision making under
demand information updating.
The choice of the commitment time leads to some interesting and surprising results. We
find that the buyer is not always better off delaying its quantity commitment, even when
there is no explicit cost associated with doing so. We also find conditions under which the
supplier prefers a delayed commitment. In particular, we find that the choice of commit-
ment time depends upon the power structure of the supply chain, as well as the amount of
uncertainty over end-product demand that is reduced by additional information received be-
fore the buyer makes her production decisions. Regarding the value of information, we find
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that in a decentralized supply chain operating under delayed commitment and a low supplier
margin, additional demand information leads to lower expected profits for both the supplier
and the buyer. More specifically, our analysis yields the following managerial insights
1. Given an exogenous exchange price and no information updating, both members of the
supply chain are indifferent to the choice of commitment time.
2. Given an exogenous exchange price and some positive amount of information updating,
both the buyer and the supplier prefer an early commitment for low exchange prices
and a delayed commitment for high exchange prices.
3. For decentralized supply chains operating under early commitment and Normally dis-
tributed demand, the order quantity from the buyer and both members’ expected
profits are non-decreasing in the amount of demand information updating.
4. For decentralized supply chains operating under delayed commitment, both members’
expected profits decrease with the amount of demand information updating when the
supplier’s margin is small.
5. Given an exchange price chosen by the supplier and all levels of information updating,
the buyer prefers an early commitment while the supplier prefers a delayed commit-
ment.
6. Given an exchange price chosen by the buyer and all levels of information updating, the
buyer prefers an early commitment while the supplier prefers a delayed commitment.
7. When the buyer and the supplier set an “equal profits” price, we observe numeri-
cally that both members prefer an early commitment for small reductions in demand
uncertainty and a delayed commitment for large reductions.
This is a first step in understanding the impact of the quantity commitment time choices
in a manufacturer-parts supplier contract. Future research issues include the impact of
multiple suppliers, multiple buyers, multiple levels in the supply chain, and the inclusion of
a rolling horizon time frame.
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7 Appendix
Computational Formulation of Early Commitment Problem
In this section, we reformulate the buyer’s problem in a manner that makes it easier to obtain
numerical solutions. Knowing the buyer’s optimal production quantity in period 2 will be P ∗B =
X + k∗, the buyer’s objective function at the beginning of period 1 is
MaxQ πB(Q) = −wQ− cBE[min(X + k∗, Q)] + rE[min(X + k∗, Q, Z)] . (13)
In order to express the buyer’s objective function in terms of the distribution of the random
variables X and Y , we first determine the limits of integration. For min(X+k∗, Q), we have two
possibilities: X < Q− k∗ and X ≥ Q− k∗. For min(X + k∗, Q, Z), we have six possibilities:
1. Z ≤ X + k∗ ≤ Q : Y ≤ k∗ ≤ Q−X → Y ≤ k∗ and X ≤ Q− k∗
2. Z ≤ Q ≤ X + k∗ : Y ≤ Q−X ≤ k∗ → Y ≤ Q−X and Q− k∗ ≤ X
3. X + k∗ ≤ Z ≤ Q : k∗ ≤ Y ≤ Q−X → k∗ ≤ Y and Y ≤ Q−X
4. X + k∗ ≤ Q ≤ Z : −k∗ ≥ X −Q ≥ −Y → Q−X ≤ Y and X ≤ Q− k∗
5. Q ≤ Z ≤ X + k∗ : Q−X ≤ Y ≤ k∗ → Q− Y ≤ X and Y ≤ k∗
6. Q ≤ X + k∗ ≤ Z : Q− k∗ ≤ X ≤ X + Y − k∗ → Q− k∗ ≤ X and k∗ ≤ Y
The objective function (13) can now be expressed as
MaxQ πB(Q) = −wQ− cB
Z Q−k∗
LX
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Centralized Supply Chain Results
Here we explore the centralized supply chain, i.e., the supply chain where all decisions
are made by a central planner with the objective of maximizing total supply chain expected
profits. The centralized supply chain solutions are useful when making performance com-
parisons between our various scenarios and the results are used in several of the proofs. For
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clarification purposes, we distinguish our decision variables from the early and delayed com-
mitment cases through the placement of a carat above the corresponding variable symbol.
For instance, the parameter k becomes ǩ.
As with the previous non-centralized cases, we begin with the central planner’s period 2
decision of how much final product to produce, PB. This decision is made after observing
the additional demand information i.e. X = x. The centralized supply chain’s second period
objective is
MaxP̌B π̌(P̌B, x) = −cBP̌B + rE[min(P̌B, x+ Y )] .
Performing a similar analysis as in the earlier cases, we find that the centralized supply







The centralized supply chain’s first period objective is
MaxP̌1 π̌(P̌S) = E[−cSP̌S − cBmin(X + ǩ∗, P̌S) + rmin(X + ǩ∗, P̌S, Z)] . (14)
As in the non-centralized case under early commitment, the objective function is concave in
P̌1. The optimal component production quantity, P̌
∗
1 , is found by solving ∂π̌(P̌S)/∂P̌S = 0.
The centralized supply chain’s total expected profit is then
π̌∗ = E[−cSP̌ ∗S − cBmin(X + ǩ∗, P̌ ∗S) + rmin(X + ǩ∗, P̌ ∗S , Z)] ¥.
Proof of Proposition 1: H(k) is concave in k. H(Q− x) is concave in Q and ∂H(Q−
x)/∂Q > 0 as long as Q− x < k∗. Thus, H(min{k∗, Q− x}) is concave for Q− x < k∗, after
which it becomes a constant function and H(min{k∗, Q−x}) is concave in Q. ~π(Q) is the sum of
a linear function of x and H(min{k∗, Q−x}), and thus is concave in Q. π(Q) is the expectation
over a linear function of Q and ~π(Q), so π(Q) must also be concave in Q.¥
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove this proposition, we first construct a way to treat ρ as a
parameter. Let U and V be independent random variables, each with mean 0 and variance 1. (For








1− ρ = √1− α2
β = α/γ .
Now construct
X = µ+ σαU
Y = σγV .
Then, Z has the correct variance, and ρ is the correct ratio.
From (3) we have
πB(Q) = EX [−wQ+ (r − c0)X +H(min{k∗, Q−X})] ,
where
H(k) = −c0k + rEY [min{k, Y }]








h(v) = −c0v + rEV [min{v, V }]












πB(Q) = EU [−w(µ+ σq) + (r − c0)(µ+ σαU)
+H(min{σγv∗,σq − σαU})]
= (r − c0 − w)µ+EU [−wσq
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+H(σγmin{v∗, q/γ − βU})]
= (r − c0 − w)µ+ σγEU [−wq/γ
+h(min{v∗, q/γ − βU})] .
Or, setting eq = q/γ and g(v) = h(min{v∗, v}),
πB(Q) = (r − c0 − w)µ+ σγEU [−weq + g(eq − βU)] .
For any ρ, the optimal eq∗ minimizes this expectation, and from it we can recover the optimal
Q∗ = µ+ σγeq∗. The question is, how does eq∗ change with ρ?
Note that eq∗ solves
EU [g
0(eq − βU)] = w .
If g0 were convex, then by Jensens’s inequality this expectation would be increasing in β and hence
in ρ. Thus, eq∗ would be increasing. But g0 is not convex. It may be convex over parts of its domain,
but not all. Anyway, γ is decreasing in ρ.
Let’s consider small ρ. Consider the case of normal U and V . For small ρ and hence small β,
Pr{eq∗(0)− βU > v∗} is negligible. So, the quantity to be minimized is approximately
EU [−weq + h(eq − βU)]
= −weq +EU [−c0(eq − βU) + rEV [min{eq − βU, V }]]
= −(w + c0)eq + rEU,V [min{eq, βU + V }] .
The random variable βU + V is normal with mean 0 and variance
1 + β2 = 1 + α2/(1− α2)
= 1/γ2 .
So,






Q∗(ρ) = µ+ σγeq∗(ρ)
≈ µ+ σγ(1/γ)eq∗(0)
= µ+ σeq∗(0) = Q∗(0).
Now, h0 ≤ g0(because g truncates h at its maximum point). This approximation underestimates
g0 and hence EU [g0(eq − βU)]. Hence, the actual eq∗(ρ) is larger than (1/γ)eq∗(0). Multiplying by
γ yields something larger than eq∗(0). Thus, the exact Q∗(ρ) is larger than Q∗(0).
Proof of Proposition 3: Buyer’s expected profit: Suppose the buyer currently anticipates
receiving an information update of ρ = τ . The buyer can then expect profits of π∗B(ρ = τ) Now
assume that the buyer may obtain additional information, τ 0 > τ , before making its decisions. If
π∗B(ρ = τ) > π
∗
B(ρ = τ
0) then the buyer will know this and choose not to use the additional
information in its decision making, thus making an expected profit of π∗B(ρ = τ).
Supplier’s expected profit: From (), the buyer’s expected profit is increasing linearly in Q.
From Proposition 2, Q∗(ρ) > Q∗(0), so π∗S(ρ = τ) > π
∗
S(ρ = 0).
Proof of Proposition 4: The difference between the suppliers’s expected profit under full
information and delayed commitment minus its expected profit under no additional information
and delayed commitment is
(π̃∗S,FI − π̃∗S,NA) = −cSP̃ ∗S,FI − (w − cS)P̃ ∗S,NA + wE[min(P̃ ∗S,FI , Z)] ,
a continuous function of w. From the boundary cases, P̃ ∗S,NA = P̃
∗



















. For the NA case, LX = µ = HX and by assumption
µ+ LY = LX + LY = 0. Thus, as w → r − cB, P̃ ∗S,NA → µ+ LY = 0. The buyer makes zero
margin in the limit but still faces demand uncertainty, thus he does not order. The supplier realizes











production quantity is positive here because the buyer faces no demand uncertainty and produces
the known demand quantity, even as its margin approaches zero. Setting w = r − cB yields
(π̃∗B,FI − π̃∗B,NA) = (r − cB)E[min(P̃ ∗B,FI , Z)]− cSP̃ ∗B,FI
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= (r − cB)
Z P̃∗B,FI
0
zfZ(z)dz + (r − cB)P̃ ∗B,FI(1− F (P̃ ∗B,FI))− cSP̃ ∗B,FI
= (r − cB)
Z P̃∗B,FI
0






= (r − cB)
Z P̃∗B,FI
0
zfZ(z)dz > 0 .
Thus, for small δ > 0, π̃∗B,FI > π̃
∗






> µ + LY = 0, since in the NA case µ = LX and by assumption LX + LY = 0.
Also, P̃ ∗B,FI = F
−1
X (0) = LX = LX + LY = 0, since in the FI case LY = HY = 0. Since P̃
∗
S,NA




B,FI for exchange prices cS ≤ w ≤ cS + δ for
some δ > 0. Now
(π̃∗B,FI − π̃∗B,NA) = −wP̃ ∗B,NA − cS(P̃ ∗B1,FI − P̃ ∗B,NA) + wE[min(P̃ ∗B,FI , Z)]
≤ −wP̃ ∗B,NA − cS(P̃ ∗B,FI − P̃ ∗B,NA) + wP̃ ∗B,FI
= (w − cS)(P̃ ∗B,FI − P̃ ∗B,NA) ≤ 0 for cS ≤ w ≤ cS + δ.
The proof for the buyer’s expected profit follows similar logic. ¥
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Figure 3:  Delayed Commitment 
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Figure 5:  r = 100, c1 = c0 = 20, z ~ N(100,20), x ~ N(100, 14.14), y ~ N(0, 14.14) 
 
Figure 6:  r = 100, c1 = c0 = 20, z ~ N(100,20) 
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Total Variance 400 400 400 100 100 100 25 25 25
Buyer's manf cost 20 40 60 20 40 60 20 40 60
0 QNA 100 90 74 100 95 87 100 97 94
Variance 25 Q* 100 90 75 100 95 87 100 97 94
w = 30 Reduction 50 Q* 101 91 76 101 96 88 100 98 94
(%) 75 Q* 103 94 78 101 97 89 100 98 94
100 QFI 106 100 87 103 100 93 102 100 97
0 QNA 90 74 - 95 87 - 97 94 -
Variance 25 Q* 90 74 - 95 87 - 97 94 -
w = 50 Reduction 50 Q* 90 75 - 95 87 - 97 94 -
(%) 75 Q* 90 76 - 95 88 - 97 94 -
100 QFI 94 81 - 97 90 - 98 95 -
0 QNA 74 - - 87 - - 94 - -
Variance 25 Q* 74 - - 87 - - 94 - -
w = 70 Reduction 50 Q* 74 - - 87 - - 94 - -
(%) 75 Q* 75 - - 87 - - 94 - -
100 QFI 77 - - 89 - - 94 - -
Table 2:  Optimal First Period Order Qnty  (Normal Dist, Mean = 100, Buyer's Price =100, Supplier's Cost =10)
